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I. INTRODUCTION
STATEMENT OF THE COMMISSION'S RESPONSIBILITIES
The Labor Relations Commission is a quasi-judicial agency whose purpose
is to ensure the prompt, peaceful, and fair resolution of labor disputes by
enforcing the labor relations laws of the Commonwealth. As the state
counterpart to the National Labor Relations Board, the Commission administers
the Public Employee Bargaining Law and the Private Sector Collective
Bargaining Law, General Laws Chapter 1 50E and 1 50A respectively. These
laws give employees of state and local government, and employees of private
businesses which do not come within the jurisdiction of the NLRB the right and
protection:
to form, join, or participate in a union or association;
to bargain collectively over terms and conditions of employment
such as wages, hours and benefits;
to engage in other concerted activity for mutual aid and protection;
and
to refrain from participating in any of these activities.
The Commission has existed since 1937, and its jurisdiction has been
expanded frequently. The legislature has granted full collective bargaining
rights to state, county and municipal employees in the executive and judicial
branches of government. Approximately 98% of the Commission's caseload
deals with labor matters affecting public employees and 2% of the caseload
concerns the employees of private employers. By guaranteeing to employees
the right to choose freely whether or not to be represented by a union and by
impartially adjudicating claims between employees, employers and unions, the
Commission ensures that labor and management live within the strictures of the
state's collective bargaining laws. Through its case resolution techniques the
Commission establishes labor relations policy for public employees throughout
Massachusetts.
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Pursuant to its responsibility to ensure the timely, peaceful, and fair
resolution of labor disputes, the Commission performs the following primary
functions:
1 Disposition of Unfair Labor Practice Charges
The Commission adjudicates charges of unfair labor practices as defined
by the Laws. For example, charges may be filed by either a union or an
employer alleging that the opposing party has not bargained in good faith. A
charge may be filed by an individual against an employer claiming that the
employer has discriminated against her or him because of her or his union
activity. Charges may also stem from allegations by individuals that their union
has not represented them fairly.
Whenever an employee, union, or employer files a charge with the
Commission claiming that either an employer or union has committed an unfair
labor practice, the Commission investigates the charge and after reviewing the
facts alleged and legal arguments of the parties, determines whether it has
"probable cause" to issue a complaint and conduct a hearing. If the charge is
dismissed without a hearing, the charging party may request reconsideration of
the matter by the Commission. If the Commission affirms the dismissal, the
charging party may seek judicial review in the Appeals Court.
If the Commission determines that probable cause exists to believe that
the law has been violated, a complaint is issued and a public hearing is
conducted. At the hearing, the parties may be represented by counsel,
witnesses are sworn and evidence is taken. Following the hearing each side
has the opportunity either to file briefs or to offer closing arguments.
The administrative law judge may issue either a decision or recommended
findings of fact. Either may be reviewed by the full Commission. Final
Commission decisions may be appealed to the Massachusetts Appeals Court.
All administrative law judge and final Commission decisions are written
and are periodically published for the benefit of the public and the labor
community in the Massachusetts Labor Cases , a private reporter service. The
Commission's decisions are also available by CD ROM subscription through the
Social Law Library. Excerpts of the decisions are also published in Mass.
Lawyer's Weekly , National Public Employment Reporter , Government Employee
Relations Report , Labor Relations Reporter, and Public Employee Bargaining .
The Commission's decisions guide the conduct of collective bargaining and the
relationship between labor and management throughout the Commonwealth.
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2. Conduct of Representation Elections and Bargaining Unit
Determination
The Commission conducts secret ballot elections so that employees may
choose whether to be represented by a union. Elections are conducted
whenever (1) one or more employee organizations claim to represent a
substantial number of employees in an appropriate unit; (2) an employee
organization petitions the Commission alleging that a substantial number of
employees wish to be represented by the petitioner; or (3) a substantial number
of employees in a bargaining unit allege that the exclusive representative no
longer represents a majority of the employees.
Elections may be conducted "on site" or by mail ballot procedures depending
on the size of the unit and the relative cost of each type of election.
By law, the Commission also must determine what bargaining unit is
"appropriate" for collective bargaining. The agency must consider the
"community of interest" that exists between different classifications of
employees, the efficiency of the employer's operations, and the interests of
employees in "effective" representation. The Commission assists the parties
to reach agreement concerning an appropriate unit. When no agreement is
possible, however, the Commission holds a hearing and issues a written
decision.
3. Prevention and Termination of Strikes
Strikes by the employees of most public employers are illegal under
General Laws Chapter 1 50E. When a public employer believes that a strike has
occurred or is imminent, the employer may file a petition with the Commission
for an investigation. The Commission quickly investigates and decides whether
an unlawful strike is occurring or about to occur. If unlawful strike activity is
found the Commission directs striking employees back to work and issues other
orders designed to help the parties resolve the underlying dispute. Most strikes
end after issuance of the Commission's order, but judicial enforcement of the
order sometimes necessitates Superior Court litigation which can result in court-
imposed sanctions against strikers.
4. Agency Service Fee Determinations
Chapter 1 50E allows public employers to enter into collective bargaining
agreements which require non-union employees covered by the agreement to
pay an agency service fee to the union, "commensurate with the cost of
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collective bargaining and contract administration," as a condition of continued
employment. Employees may challenge the amount of the annual agency
service fee by filing an "amount" charge with the Commission. Such charges
require a detailed evaluation of the union's expenses. Employees also may
challenge a union's legal right to collect a fee by filing a validity charge with the
Commission. Hundreds of charges are filed each year raising questions of
constitutional rights, auditing and accounting practices as well as some labor
policy issues. The Commission's rulings have set precedent in this emerging
area of the law.
5. Court Litigation
Parties to final decisions issued by the Commission may appeal the
decision directly to the Massachusetts Appeals Court. For this reason the
Commission functions as a trial level court for labor relations cases. Further
appellate review may be sought before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court. In addition, the Commission may bring suit in the Appeals Court to
enforce compliance with final decisions of the Agency. Although the Appeals
Court has original jurisdiction over Commission final orders, the Supreme
Judicial Court often takes cases directly on appeal either at the request of a
party or on its own motion. The Commission also occasionally must seek
judicial enforcement in Superior Court of orders directing public employees to
cease engaging in illegal strike activities. Commission staff attorneys
represent the Commission and conduct all of the agency's litigation.
6. Other Responsibilities
The Commission processes unit clarification petitions and requests for
binding arbitration. Clarification petitions may be filed by an employee
organization or an employer for the purpose of clarifying or amending a
recognized or certified bargaining unit.
Massachusetts law specifies that a party to a collective bargaining
agreement that does not contain a grievance procedure culminating in final and
binding arbitration, may petition the Commission to order grievance arbitration.
These "Requests For Binding Arbitration" are processed quickly by the
Commission to assist the parties to resolve their grievances.
Sections 13 and 14 of Chapter 1 50E require the Labor Relations
Commission to maintain a list of employee organizations and the bargaining
units they represent. Section 7 of Chapter 1 50E requires public employers to
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file copies of all collective bargaining agreements with the Commission. The
Commission requires labor organizations to provide the following information:
the name and address of current officers, address where notices can be sent,
date of organization, date of certification, and expiration date of signed
agreements. Each organization must also file an annual report with the
Commission containing: "the aims and objectives of such organization, the
scale of dues, initiation fees, fines and assessments to be charged to the
members, and the annual salaries to be paid officers." Budget constraints
preclude institution of a "tickler" system to remind labor organizations of their
filing obligations. Instead, the Commission relies upon various internal case-
processing incentives to encourage compliance with the filing requirements.
7. Caseload summary
As case statistics indicate, the Commission primarily serves the public
sector population including individual employees, unions, and employers. Public
employment statistics retrieved from the findings of the 1987 Census of
Governments, Survey of Government Employment 1 disclose that of the total
number of full-time and part-time public employees, 69.3 percent or 227,648,
were represented in bargaining units. As of October 1987, the number of
public employee bargaining units in state and local governments, including
school districts and special districts, was 2,563, an increase of 411, or 19
percent, from October 1982.
During fiscal year 1993, 994 cases were filed with the Labor Relations
Commission. Of these, 979, or 98.5%, were filed pursuant to the agency's
public sector collective bargaining jurisdiction under General Laws Chapter
150E. The remaining 15 cases dealt with the Commission's authority under
General Laws Chapter 1 50A.
8. Agency Priorities
The Commission's highest priority is to enforce the state's collective
bargaining laws and to promote productive labor relations by resolving cases
filed with the Commission as quickly as possible. Time required to resolve a
case varies depending upon the nature of the legal claims, the resources of the
1 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census. 1987
Census of Government , v. 3, no. 3, "Labor-Management Relations in
State and Local Governments". Washington, D.C., June 1991.
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parties and the resources of the Commission. Each charge requires docketing
and clerical time; investigation and deliberation time; preparation of a complaint
or dismissal order; and, when the charges are deemed sufficiently meritorious,
a hearing with detailed factual findings and a legal decision, followed by time
for appeals. Constitutional principles of due process dictate each step in the
procedure; but the Commission has implemented techniques designed to reduce
the agency personnel time required to perform each step. Beginning July 1,
1 993, the Commission has instituted a mandatory written procedure policy for
unfair labor practice cases. This policy, which requires the parties to submit
detailed documentation to the Commission, replaces time consuming, in-person
investigation procedures and will eventually result in a faster processing of
cases. During FY 1 994 the Commission will implement additional procedures
intended to emphasize case settlement as a means to improve productivity by
resolving cases without time consuming trials.
Simultaneously the Commission is committed to quality. By delivering
clear legal opinions that provide guidance to the labor-management community,
the Commission attempts not only to resolve the specific legal controversy that
is the subject of the decision, but also to establish clear legal precedent that
will guide other parties in the conduct of their labor relations.
II. STRUCTURE OF THE COMMISSION
The Commission consists of three members who are appointed by the
Governor for staggered five-year terms. One Commissioner is designated as
chairperson. Any member of the Commission may be removed by the governor,
upon notice and hearing, for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office, but for
no other cause. The Commission has the authority to make, amend and rescind
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of
the law. The Commissioners manage the Commission, hear and decide cases
pending before the agency, authorize all litigation, and manage all personnel.
For administrative purposes, the Commission is within, but not subject to the
jurisdiction of, the Executive Office of Labor.
The Executive Secretary directs and supervises certain employees of the
Commission. He or she assists the Commissioners in budgetary and other
administrative matters, informs the Commission of the status of all matters
pending before it, and maintains a permanent record of the disposition of cases.
The Assistant to the Executive Secretary supervises all case scheduling at the
Commission.
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The Chief Counsel directs and supervises the legal staff in their duties of
investigating cases, conducting hearings, and writing decisions. He or she also
serves as the Commissioners' principal legal advisor. The Deputy Chief Counsel
supervises the legal staff with respect to all litigation before the courts of the
Commonwealth.
The administrative law judges and examiners, designated by the
Commission as its agents, investigate and hear cases, and write decisions.
Attorneys may also appear and represent the Commission in any court
proceeding. Election specialists conduct on-site and mail ballot representation
elections.
The administrative support staff docket all cases, type notices, decisions
and court briefs, tabulate statistics, and process all internal and external records
handled by the Commission, including personnel and purchasing records.
III. PUBLIC INFORMATION/COMMUNITY RELATIONS
The Commission understands that employees, unions and employers are
better able to comply with the law when they understand their statutory rights
and responsibilities. By providing information to the public and meeting with
groups of employers and employees, the Commission attempts to reduce the
numbers of charges filed. The Commission has authored A Guide to the Public
Employee Collective Bargaining Law (now in its 2nd edition) which explains
Commission procedures, summarizes decisions and includes the text of the law
and the Commission's regulations. The Guide is published and sold by the
University of Massachusetts Institute of Government Services and used
extensively by the public.
A Commission staff member is assigned to "Officer of the Day" duty from
1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. to aid the many people who call or walk into the
Commission with labor-related problems. Although the Commission cannot
always solve such problems, the "Officer of the Day" provides accurate
information to assist the public. The "Officer of the Day" also answers
questions from the press concerning the status of various cases before the
Commission. The Commission receives many public information inquiries daily
and has installed a special employment law information tape-recording to
accurately answer hundreds of telephone inquiries while saving staff time.
The Commission also supplies information to three local professional
publications to inform practitioners in the field of public sector labor relations.
The Massachusetts Labor Relations Reporter publishes information concerning
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decisions, court cases, hearings, elections, complaints, and all other activities;
Massachusetts Labor Cases prints all Commission decisions in full; and
Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly prints summaries of Commission decisions.
Commission decisions are also frequently reported in national publications,
including Government Employee Relations Reporter , the Bureau of National
Affairs Labor Relations Reference Manual , and the Commerce Clearing House
Labor Cases .
Commission agents travel across the state in an effort to make the
Commission's services more accessible. Most elections are conducted at the
place of employment. The Commission has also provided training to large
groups of constituents to prevent prohibited practices.
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LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
FISCAL YEAR 1993
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION HIGHLIGHTS
The issue in Brockton School Committee , 19 MLC 1 120 (1992) was
whether a School Committee can decline to bargain about economic items
during negotiations for a successor agreement unless it receives additional
funds from the appropriating body. The Commission concluded that a School
Committee is free to offer a good faith proposal of a 0% economic increase if
it reasonably believes it cannot afford any wage increase. Alternatively, it can
offer an increase conditioned on legislative approval of a budget of a specified
amount, or it can propose a wage reopener clause. However, it cannot simply
refuse to discuss economic items until a third party acts without the consent
of the union because to do so frustrates the bargaining process. Therefore, the
Commission found that the School Committee in this case had violated Sections
1 0(a)(1 ) and (5) of the Law by refusing to bargain until after the City Council
had finalized the School Committee's budget.
In City of Brockton , 19 MLC 1139 (1992), the issue before the
Commission was whether the City had failed to bargain in good faith when the
Brockton Retirement Board gave pay raises to three clerical employees who
worked at the Retirement Board without giving the unions representing the City
clerical employees notice and an opportunity to bargain about those increases.
The Commission was asked to determine whether the City or the Retirement
Board was the employer of the employees who received the wage increases.
The Retirement Board operated under G.L.c. 32 and was composed of
three members, including the City auditor. G.L.c. 32 confers fiscal autonomy
on municipal retirement systems, and, as a result, the City was obligated to
fund the Retirement Board's pension obligations and the full cost of
administering the Board, without control of those costs. The Retirement Board
maintained its funds in a separate account from City funds, and paid its
employees salaries directly.
The Commission re-examined the 1 982 decision in Citv of Maiden , 9 MLC
1073 (1982), in light of a subsequent Appeals Court opinion in Everett
Retirement Board v. Board of Assessors of Everett , 19 Mass. App. Ct. 305
(1985) and concluded that the Brockton Retirement Board, not the City of
Brockton, was the employer of the clerical employees who had received the
wage increase from the Retirement Board. In Everett Retirement Board , the
Appeals Court had held that the expense fund component of retirement system
budgets is not subject to municipal control. Accordingly, the Commission
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concluded that the Brockton Retirement Board had fiscal and administrative
autonomy from the City which prevented the City's control of the staffing and
expense fund components of the Board.
The Commission considered the relationship between G.L.c. 1 50E and the
Joint Labor Management Committee's (JLMC) responsibility over municipal
police and fire negotiations under Section 4A of c. 1 078 of the Acts of 1 973
(Section 4A) in Town of Stoughton, 19 MLC 1155 (1992). Noting that the
JLMC procedures under Section 4A are directed at resolving disputes over
contract terms while the Commission's statutory mandate contemplates issuing
judicially-enforceable remedies for violations of Chapter 1 50E, the Commission
found nothing in the language of either statute that would preclude the
Commission from exercising jurisdiction over the same parties or the same
dispute that might be before the JLMC. Rather, the Commission concluded that
the two statutory schemes must be read in harmony so that the Commission's
adjudicatory role and the JLMC's conciliatory role are both preserved.
Therefore, the potential for the JLMC asserting jurisdiction did not preclude the
Commission from determining whether the parties were at impasse for purposes
of Chapter 1 50E.
Next, the Commission considered whether the parties to a bargaining
dispute are obligated to exhaust the procedures under Section 4A before an
employer could lawfully implement a proposal. Noting that Section 9 of
Chapter 1 50E had been amended, following the decision in Commonwealth of
Massachusetts , 8 MLC 1978 (1982), aff'd sub nom. Massachusetts
Organization of State Engineers and Scientists v. Labor Relations Commission ,
389 Mass. 920 (1 983), to require exhaustion of dispute resolution procedures
prior to implementation of any unilateral change, the Commission found
significant the absence of any similar amendment to Section 4A. As a
consequence, the Commission concluded it is not a p_er se violation of c. 1 50E
for employer to implement changes in working conditions that are reasonably
comprehended in its bargaining proposals prior to exhaustion of the mediation,
fact-finding and arbitration dispute resolution procedures under Section 4A.
Instead, the Commission announced its intent to continue to analyze on a case-
by-case basis whether the parties were at a good faith bargaining impasse
when on party implements a unilateral change consistent with its last
bargaining proposal.
The central issue in Lawrence School Committee , 1 9 MLC 1 1 67 (1 992)
was whether the validity of a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by a
school committee outside of Boston was contingent on funding by the
legislative body or whether those agreements are enforceable when executed.
The Commission determined that the literal language of the last sentence of
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Section 7(b) of the Law exempts school committee contracts outside of Boston
from the requirement that public employers submit requests for appropriations
necessary to fund cost items to the appropriate legislative body. The
Commission also relied on the language of G.L.c. 71 , Section 34, which gives
school committees autonomy over expenditures within an aggregate
appropriation from the municipal legislative body. Therefore, the Commission
held that, although a school committee may request additional funding to cover
the cost of a collective bargaining agreement, the agreement is not contingent
on funding and is valid at the time it is executed.
In City of Boston , 1 9 MLC 1 203 (1 992), the Commission considered for
the first time whether an involuntary transfer infringed on an employee's right
to engage in activities protected by Section 2 of the Law in violation of Section
10(a)(1). The affected employee was the sole police mechanic assigned to a
particular location and was the local Union president. As Union president, he
would take Union leave for Union business as the need arose. He was also
absent on occasion because of vacation or illness. The employee received
notice that he was being transferred, and, when he asked the reasons for the
transfer, his supervisor told him that the City needed a mechanic at his work
location forty hours a week. His supervisor also expressed concern about the
amount and unpredictability of his union duties. The employee's ability to
perform his Union duties were largely unaffected by the transfer.
Absent evidence that the transferred Union president's new job was less
desirable than his previous position, that his job duties had changed or that his
Union activities had been restricted by the transfer, the Commission determined
that the transfer has no tangible adverse impact. Therefore, the Commission
was unable to determine that the City's action was coercive or had a chilling
effect on the employee's right to engage in protected activities.
The issue in Town of Fairhaven , Case No. AO-1 3 (August 20, 1 992) was
whether a drug testing screening proposal submitted during negotiations for a
successor contract covering public works employees was a mandatory subject
of bargaining. Applying the balancing test first articulated in Town of Danvers ,
3 MLC 1559 (1977), the Commission determined that the general subject of
drug testing for public works employees is a mandatory subject of bargaining.
The Commission reasoned that drug testing, like other physical examinations,
may directly affect an employee's job security, assignments, and conditions of
continued employment. Further the Commission was unable to identify any
overriding managerial prerogative that would outweigh the employee's interest
in bargaining about the effects of drug testing on their working conditions.
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The Commission next considered whether the specified proposal should
have been exempt from the bargaining obligation because the union alleged that
it would require a waiver of individual constitutional rights. The Commission
concluded that the disputed proposal did not on its face waive individual
constitutional rights because the language of that provision satisfied the
probable causes standards set out in the relevant state and Federal cases,
including National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab , 489 U.S. 656
(1989) and Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n, Inc. v. State Racing
Commission, 403 Mass. 692 (1989).
Two cases decided by the Commission, City of Everett , 19 MLC 1304
(1992) (on appeal) and Board of Regents of Higher Education , 19 MLC 1248
(1 992) concerned the obligation to bargain about health insurance benefits. In
Board of Regents of Higher Education, the Commission considered whether the
Board of Regents was required to bargain about the decision and the impact of
the decision to change health insurance plans and carriers. Under G.L.c. 32A,
the Group Insurance Commission (GIC) is authorized to negotiate with and
purchase group health insurance policies and determines the amount of health
insurance benefits to be provided to state employees. Notwithstanding the
GIC's role, however, Chapter 32 does not restrict the statutory employer of
state employees from bargaining about health insurance benefits.
In light of this statutory scheme, the Commission concluded that the
Board of Regents was not required to bargain about the decision to change
health insurance benefits because the decision to change insurance benefits
was within the exclusive control of the GIC, which was not the statutory
employer of the employees of the Board of Regents. However, the Commission
found that the impact of GIC's change on terms and conditions of employment
was within the scope of mandatory subjects of bargaining and was subject to
a bargaining obligation. In reaching this conclusion, the Commission reasoned
that the statutory employer of state employees could (and frequently did)
negotiate supplemental insurance benefits, like those administered through a
health and welfare trust fund, that do not conflict with provisions of C.32A.
In Citv of Everett , the central issue was whether the language of Chapter
653 of the Acts of 1 989 relieved the City of any obligation to bargain with the
Union representing its fire fighters before requiring those employees to
contribute 10% toward the cost of their HMO premiums. The pertinent
language of Chapter 653 provided, in part, that employees would pay a
minimum of ten percent for the cost of HMO health insurance coverage,
effective July 1, 1990. Further, Section 218 of Chapter 653 provided that,
where the percentage contribution was established under a collective bargaining
agreement, that contribution rate could not be altered until the applicable
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collective bargaining agreement had expired or the parties had agreed to
another contribution rate.
The Commission determined that this issue required it to interpret the
collective bargaining agreement in effect between the parties on July 1 , 1 990,
which included the intent of the parties when they entered into that agreement
and their prior practices regarding HMO coverage. The pertinent contract
language provided that, for the life of the agreement, the city would maintain
the "Blue Cross/Blue Shield Municipal Master Medical Plan in effect on July 1,
1974 or its equivalent." The Commission concluded that this language
determined explicitly the employees' share of HMO premiums. At the time the
parties negotiated that language, the City offered its employees coverage under
either an indemnity plan or an HMO, under c. 32B, Section 1 6, which required
the City at the time to contribute the same dollar amount toward HMO
premiums that it contributed toward indemnity plan premiums. Therefore, the
Commission concluded that the rate for HMO premiums was one of the
equivalent programs referred to in the parties' agreement and that the City
could not change that contribution rate without first bargaining with the Union.
The issue of whether a public employer unlawfully interfered with
restrained, or coerced employees in the exercise of their rights in violation of
Section 10(a)(1) of the Law was raised in three decisions decided by the
Commission during the past year. In Wakefield School Committee , 19 MLC
1355 (1992), the Commission considered whether the School Committee
violated Section 1 0(a)(1 ) by preventing the president of the union representing
its teachers from addressing the School Committee during the public
participation portion of a School Committee meeting. The evidence before the
Commission was that the School Committee had adopted a policy allowing for
public participation at a portion of School Committee meetings. As part of that
policy, the School Committee expressly limited employee participation during
the public portion of the School Committee meetings to require employees to
work through the school administration to resolve problems at the lowest
possible level. Therefore, when the Union president attempted to speak at the
public participation portion of a School Committee meeting to protest the hiring
or an additional administrator, the School Committee suggested that she take
up her concerns with the appropriate school administrators, even though she
claimed to have discussed the issue repeatedly with the Superintendent.
The Commission found that the School Committee's policy was narrowly
drawn, applied to all employees without regard to their union membership, and
fostered a legitimate labor relations objective resolving concerns about
employment matters at the lowest possible level. However, the Commission
found that the application of the rule on the facts of this case violated Section
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10(a)(1) because the manner in which the rule was applied stifled criticism of
an issue already raised at a lower level of the school system because the
employer did not want the issue discussed publicly.
Quincv School Committee. 19 MLC 1476 (1992) also raised an issue
concerning whether an employer's policy restricting employee conduct violated
Section 1 0(a)(1 ) of the Law. After a representation petition had been filed with
the Commission, the Superintendent issued a memorandum to administrators
stating that no representatives of labor organizations should be allowed to
distribute literature in the school building, school mailboxes should not be used
for that purpose, although school principals could choose to display those
materials on a bulletin board available for literature from any parties, and no
representatives of an employee organization should be allowed to meet with
teachers within a school during school time to discuss representation. Although
there was an unwritten no solicitation rule prohibiting all union solicitation on
school premises during the school day before the Superintendent issues his
memorandum, the principals had applied that policy inconsistently.
The Commission acknowledged that a public employer may promulgate
rules regulating the distribution of union literature provided those rules are
neutral and nondiscriminatory so as not to unduly restrict employee access to
union information. Further, the Commission noted that a public employer may
restrict access to its premises by non-employees in a nondiscriminatory manner
provided unions can communicate with employees through other means.
Here, the Commission found that the written policy promulgated by the
Superintendent failed to satisfy those requirements in several ways. First, the
policy did not indicate that teachers had non-working time during the school
day when non-work subjects, including union representation, could be
appropriately discussed. Second, the written policy gave the principals of each
school the discretion to decide whether to display union literature. Finally, the
School Committee offered no reason to justify denying union representation
access to school premises, even though it had an inconsistent practice or
permitting them access in the past.
In Town of Winchester, 1 9 MLC 1 597 (1 992), the president of the Union
representing the Town's fire fighters has drafted and distributed an open letter
to citizens of surrounding communities criticizing the Town's action in reducing
the level of its fire protection services. That letter was published in several area
newspapers. At a subsequent meeting of the Board of Selectmen, a member
of the Board made a statement to the effect that he appreciate the hard work
of fire fighters and that he considered the letter to be a reflection on the Union,
rather than on the employees. He then stated that thought there was a process
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and a proper way of dealing with those issues and that articles like the one the
Union president sent did not serve the process well.
Although the Commission found the Union president's letter to be
concerted activity protected by Section 2 of the Law, it did not find that the
statement at the Selectmen's meeting interfered with, restrained or coerced any
employees in the exercise of their rights in violation of Section 1 0(a)(1 ) of the
Law. In reaching that conclusion, the Commission declined to impose a gag
rule that would prohibit public employers from commenting on public issues.
The Commission observed that the statement was made in a tone of remorse
and expressed the view that the Union president's letter was in bad taste and
found that it would have a chilling effect on the right to engage in protected
activity.
The issue in City of Lynn , 1 9 MLC 1 599 (1 992) (On Appeal) was whether
the City was required to bargain before the fire chief unilaterally filed an
application for an involuntary superannuation retirement for a fire fighter who
had an application for accidental disability retirement pending. The
Commission concluded that the manner in which the fire chief exercised his
discretion to file an involuntarily retirement application pursuant to G.L.c. 32,
Section 1 6 had a significant impact on conditions of employment ad required
bargaining. In addition, the Commission found that the fire chief's action in this
case was inconsistent with past practice because the chief did not pursue
involuntary applications for employees if the employees also has their own
voluntary applications pending.
In City of Boston , 19 MLC 1613 (1992) the Commission considered
whether the practice of having a paid union representative address correction
officer recruits during working hours was a mandatory subject of bargaining.
Applying the Danvers balancing test, the Commission found that allowing
unions to address new employees during training is a mandatory subject of
bargaining. The Commission reasoned that allowing a Union representative to
address new recruits benefitted the Union and the employees, who had an
interest in learning about the Union's internal procedures and their contract
rights. Further, the City advanced no managerial interests which would
outweigh the Union's interest in recruiting new members and the employee's
interest in exercising their right of self-organization.
Town of Ware , 19 MLC 1700 (1993) involved a request for binding
arbitration pursuant to Section 8 of the Law filed by an individual employee.
The recognition clause in the agreement under which the employee requested
arbitration stated that the Town recognized "all Administrative Personnel as a
comprehensive committee for the purpose of collective bargaining in Chapter
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1 49, Section 1 78N..." The Town opposed the request on the grounds that the
Administrative Personnel group was not an employee organization within the
meaning of Section 1 of the Law and that an individual members of that group
had no standing to file a request for binding arbitration.
Citing Massachusetts Correction Officers Federated Union , 1 5 MLC 1 380
(1 989), the Commission found that the Administrative Personnel group was an
employee organization within the meaning of Section 1 of the law. The
Commission reasoned that, even though the group had no officers, by-laws, or
dues, one of the purposes of the group was to bargain with the Town over
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. Moreover,
because the parties' agreement did not restrict the role of an individual
employee from filing and processing grievances, up through and including an
order pursuant to Section 8 of the Law, the Commission found the employee
to be a party to the agreement for the purposes of Section 8 with the requisite
standing to file a request for binding arbitration.
Citv of Beverly , 19 MLC 1724 (1993) (On Appeal) raised the issue
whether a clause in the collective bargaining agreement between the City and
the Union representing the police patrol officers was an illegal parity provision.
The disputed clause provided that "No officer of the rank above that of
sergeant shall be assigned any detail unless he is in a detail of three (3) or more
men." The Commission held that this clause was valid work preservation
clause that defined the work that was to be considered non-bargaining unit
work. The clause was not an illegal parity clause because it did not force one
unit to bargain the wages, benefits, or other terms and conditions of
employment of another unit. Any work preservation agreement necessarily
restricts other bargaining units from performing the same work; but such a
restriction does not constitute an illegal parity agreement.
The Commission clarified the obligations of labor and management when,
during negotiations, each waits for the other to make a proposal. Reiterating
that no party can change the status quo ante of a mandatory subject of
bargaining without (i) agreement of the other party, (ii) impasse in negotiations,
or (iii) waiver by the other party or its right to negotiate, the Commission
explained that no waiver occurs while a party who has protested a change
awaited further proposals from the party who has proposed the change. The
Commission also noted that one party may not establish an artificial or
unreasonable deadline for completing negotiations in an effort to reduce the
time available for bargaining. Town of Natick , 19 MLC 1753 (1993).
In Citv of Chicopee , 1 9 MLC 1 765 (1 993), (On Appeal) the Commission
held that only appointed officials who are managerial employees are excluded
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from collective bargaining by Section 1 of c. 150E. Because the parties
stipulated that Deputy Collector, Assistant City Clerk, Assistant Assessor and
Assistant Treasurer were appointed, non-managerial positions, there was no
statutory reasons to exclude the positions from the bargaining unit, and the City
violated its obligation to bargain in good faith when it refused to bargain with
the Union regarding the disputed positions.
In a ruling on a Motion to Dismiss in Massachusetts Water Resources
Authority , 19 MLC 17778 (1993), the Commission clarified the term "open
period" as it applies to the contract bar rule. The MWRA argued that, because
the parties signed an agreement which was retroactively effective to a period
before the filing of the petition, the agreement should act as a bar to the
petition just as if the contract had been in effect on the date that the petition
was filed. In denying the MWRA's motion, the Commission noted that the
MWRA did not contend it was unaware of the pendency of the petition at the
time of the execution of the agreement. The MWRA could have completed
contract negotiations cognizant of the potential expansion of the bargaining
unit. Therefore, the pendency of the petition served the purpose of the
contract bar rule, which is to promote stability in labor relations by ensuring all
parties are aware of which unit positions are included in the unit covered by
their collective bargaining agreement.
In Town of Tewksburv , MUP-901 6 (1 993), the Commission held that the
Town engaged in a prohibited practice when the Town Manager told Union
representatives that if they did not support a proposed level-funded budget with
no lay-offs, at a town meeting he would recommend a lower budget with lay-
offs. The Commission concluded that speaking at a town meeting is activity
protected by §2 of the Law, and that a reasonable employee would have
understood the Town Manager's statements to be a threat not to speak against
the budget proposal at the town meeting. Therefore, the Town violated the
Law because this threat would manifest itself by tending to restrain or coerce
employees from exercising their statutory rights to speak freely in support of
their views at the town meeting.
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EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE BARGAINING
1935 Wagner Act (National Labor Relations Act) gave collective
bargaining rights to private sector employees in interstate
commerce.
1937 Massachusetts passes Chapter 1 50A extending bargaining
rights to private sector employees within the Commonwealth;
Labor Relations Commission established.
1 958 All public employees (except police officers) granted the right
to join unions and to "present proposals" to public
employers. Chapter 149, Section 1 78D.
1960 Employees of city of town could bargain provided that the
law was accepted by the city or town. There were no
specific procedures for elections nor the manner and method
of bargaining. Chapter 40, Section 4C.
1962 The Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, the Massachusetts
Port Authority, the Massachusetts Parking Authority, and the
Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket Steamship
Authority became subject to the representation and unfair
labor practice provisions of Chapter 1 50A.
1964 State employees given the right to bargain with respect to
working conditions (but not wages). Chapter 419, Section
1 78F. However, it was not until 1 965 when the Director of
Personnel and Standardization promulgated the rules
governing recognition of employee organizations and
collective bargaining negotiations that bargaining took place.
1964 Chapter 1 50A amended to include health care facilities as
"employers" and nurses as "employees."
1 965 Municipal employees given the right to bargain about wages,
hours, and terms and conditions of employment Chapter
419, Sections 178G-N. This repealed Chapter 40, S.4C.
1 968 Chapter 1 50A amended to expressly include private nonprofit
institutions as "employers" and nonprofessional employees
of a health care facility or of private nonprofit institutions
(except members of religious orders) as "employees."
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1969 Medonca Commission established by legislature to revise
public employee bargaining laws.
1973 Most public employees - state and municipal - extended full
bargaining rights under comprehensive new statute, Chapter
1 50E; binding arbitration of interest disputes involving police
and fire employees.
1974 Chapter 1 50E amended to strengthen enforcement powers
of Labor Relations Commission, modify union unfair labor
practices, modify standards for exclusion of managerial
employees.
1975 LRC issued standards for appropriate bargaining units
affecting fifty-five thousand state employees in more than
two thousand job classifications. Ten statewide units were
created-five non-professional and five professional. Statute
passed providing for separate bargaining unit for state police.
[Employees of the University of Massachusetts, and the state
and community colleges also have separate units.]
1977 Chapter 1 50E extended to court employees in the judicial
branch; two state-wide units (excepting Middlesex and
Suffolk Counties' Superior Court court officers) established
for judicial branch employees.
1977 Housing authorities and their employees covered by the
representation and prohibited practice sections of Chapter
1 50E. [Most other Authorities remain subject, to varying
degrees, to Chapter 1 50A.]
1 977 Joint Labor-Management Commission established to oversee
collective bargaining negotiations and impasses involving
municipal police officers or fire fighters.
1977 Agency service fee provisions are clarified to require that
employee organizations provide a rebate procedure and to
indicate which expenditures may be rebated to employees.
1980 "Proposition 2 1/2" enacted, repealing final and binding
arbitration for police and firefighter contract negotiations.
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Chapter 1 50E amended to make decisions of the Labor
Relations Commission reviewable in the Appeals Court.
Labor Relations Commission empowered to refer to bargain
cases to the Board of Conciliation and Arbitration of the
Joint-Labor Management Committee for mediation.
Section 1 1 of Chapter 1 50E amended to articulate the
standard for issuing complaints in prohibited practice cases.
The definition of "employer" or "public employer" in Section
1 of Chapter 1 50E was amended to specifically include all
political subdivisions, with limited exceptions. In addition,
the definition of "professional employee" in Section 1 of
Chapter 1 50E was amended to specifically include a
detective, member of a detective bureau or police officer
who is primarily engaged in investigative work in any city or
town police department with more than 400 employees.
LRC issues comprehensive regulations setting forth agency
service fee procedures, including requirements for unions to
collect a fee pursuant to Section 1 2 of Chapter 1 50E and for
employees to challenge the amount of validity of the fee.
Chapter 1 50A amended to specifically cover private vendors
who contract with the state or its political subdivisions to
provide certain social and other services.
The definition of "employer" or "public employer" in Section
1 of Chapter 1 50E was amended to include the newly
created Massachusetts Water Resources Authority.
Chapter 1 50E amended to forbid employers from unilaterally
changing employees' wages, hours and working conditions
until the collective bargaining process (including mediation,
factfinding or arbitration, if applicable) has been completed.
Arbitration reinstituted for police and firefighter contract
negotiations, with arbitration awards subject to funding by
the legislative body.
LRC revises regulations to clarify procedures and increase
efficiency.
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DOCKET CLASSIFICATION CODES
CASES FILED FISCAL 1993
MCR PETITION FILED BY OR ON BEHALF OF MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES
SEEKING CERTIFICATION OR DECERTIFICATION OF AN
EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION
91
MCRE MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES SEEKS TO RESOLVE CLAIM OF
REPRESENTATION BY ONE OR MORE EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION
0
SCR PETITION BY OR ON BEHALF OF EMPLOYEES OF THE
COMMONWEALTH SEEKING CERTIFICATION OR DECERTIFICATION
OR AN EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION
6
SCRE STATE EMPLOYEE SEEKS TO RESOLVE CLAIM OF REPRESENTATION
BY ONE OR MORE EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATIONS
0
CR PETITION BY OR ON BEHALF OF PRIVATE EMPLOYEES SEEKING 3
CERTIFICATION OR DECERTIFICATION OR AN EMPLOYEES
ORGANIZATION
CRE PRIVATE EMPLOYER SEEKS TO RESOLVE CLAIM OR REPRESENTATION 0
BY ONE OR MORE EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATIONS
CAS EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION OR EMPLOYER SEEK CLARIFICATION OR 38
AMENDMENT OF RECOGNIZED OR CERTIFIED BARGAINING UNIT
MUP CHARGE FILED BY INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEES OR EMPLOYEE 491
ORGANIZATION AGAINST MUNICIPAL EMPLOYER
MUPL CHARGE FILED BY MUNICIPAL EMPLOYER OR AN INDIVIDUAL 80
AGAINST EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION
SUP CHARGE FILED BY INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEES OR EMPLOYEE 147
ORGANIZATION AGAINST STATE EMPLOYER
SUPL CHARGE FILED BY STATE EMPLOYER OR INDIVIDUAL AGAINST 35
AN EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION
UP COMPLAINT FILED BY STATE EMPLOYER OR INDIVIDUAL AGAINST 10
AN EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION
UPL COMPLAINT FILED BY PRIVATE EMPLOYER OR INDIVIDUAL AGAINST 5
EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION
ASF CHARGED FILED BY EMPLOYEE AGAINST AN EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION 78
CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY AND/OR AMOUNT OF AN AGENCY FEE
SI PETITION FILED BY A PUBLIC EMPLOYER REQUESTING THE 2
TO INVESTIGATE STRIKE THREAT BY EMPLOYEES
RBA EMPLOYEE OR EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION REQUEST COMMISSION TO 2
ORDER BINDING ARBITRATION. SECTION 8 OF G.L.C.150E
AO PETITION FILED BY EITHER PARTY TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 1
NEGOTIATIONS SEEKING AN ADVISORY RULING TO DETERMINE IF A
WRITTEN BARGAINING PROPOSAL IS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF
" ' MANDATORY NEGOTIATIONS. SECTION 6 OF G.L.C.1 50E
TOTAL OF ALL CASES FILED FY 994
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COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
FINANCIAL STATEMENT
FISCAL YEAR 1993
General Appropriation Received $875,202
Salary Reserve Account Transfer $4,006
TOTAL AVAILABLE $879,208
EXPENDITURES:
Salaries $813,108
Employee Mileage & Training $2,105
Contracted Student Interns $2,230
Unemployment, Medicare & Universal Health $8,842
Office & Administrative Expenses $32,421
Work/Study Students & Temporary Clerical $3,198
Equipment Purchases $4,690
Equipment Leases & Maintenance Agreements $11,777
TOTAL EXPENDITURES $878,416
Reverted $792
25


